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Client-Rooted Decryption Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) for Secure Cloud-Based Inspection of Encrypted Traffic

발명심사 중
20청구항 · 3 독립항
§ Ⅰ

개요

발명자

Loren Weith; Yaroslav Rosomakho; John A. Chanak; Vadim Tarnavsky; Lidor Pergament

IPC 분류

H4L 9/32H4L 9/40

CPC 분류

H4L9/3263H4L63/428H4L63/1416

Techniques for implementing a client-rooted decryption Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) to securely inspect encrypted traffic in cloud-based proxy environments are disclosed. A proxy node generates an intermediate Certificate Authority (CA) certificate signing request (CSR) and sends it to a client device equipped with a locally-managed root CA. The client device cross-signs the CSR, creating a client-specific intermediate CA certificate, which it returns to the proxy node. This client-specific intermediate CA certificate is scoped uniquely to the individual client device, significantly reducing the potential blast radius in case of CA key compromise. The proxy node uses the client-specific CA certificate to dynamically generate short-lived, scoped decryption certificates for inspecting encrypted traffic. This architecture provides client-level control of trust boundaries, enhanced traceability, reduced complexity, and improved scalability of encrypted traffic inspection, minimizing the operational risks associated with conventional centralized certificate management.

원문 (중국어)

Techniques for implementing a client-rooted decryption Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) to securely inspect encrypted traffic in cloud-based proxy environments are disclosed. A proxy node generates an intermediate Certificate Authority (CA) certificate signing request (CSR) and sends it to a client device equipped with a locally-managed root CA. The client device cross-signs the CSR, creating a client-specific intermediate CA certificate, which it returns to the proxy node. This client-specific intermediate CA certificate is scoped uniquely to the individual client device, significantly reducing the potential blast radius in case of CA key compromise. The proxy node uses the client-specific CA certificate to dynamically generate short-lived, scoped decryption certificates for inspecting encrypted traffic. This architecture provides client-level control of trust boundaries, enhanced traceability, reduced complexity, and improved scalability of encrypted traffic inspection, minimizing the operational risks associated with conventional centralized certificate management.